I am currently working on two interrelated projects exploring the nature of agency, through i) our responsiveness to meanings, and iii) our involvement with technology.
i) Having Meanings in View
I am currently working on a monograph on rule-following, based on my doctoral dissertation. A proposal for the monograph is now under review with Oxford University Press for their Oxford Philosophical Monograph Series. The monograph defends a novel account of rule-following through a critical engagement with the writings of McDowell, Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein. It makes the case that, in ordinary circumstances, understanding what a sign means is a matter of perceiving its meaning. My defence of this proposal is distinctive in crucial respects. First, taking inspiration from Merleau-Ponty, I argue that the meanings we are sensitive to are not only practical, but also more basic than linguistic meanings and conceptual contents. Second, I argue that, in being perceptually available to us, these meanings are motivational, in a way that is neither rational nor merely causal. Ultimately, I suggest that, if there is something distinctive about our mode of engagement with the world, it is not to be found at the level of our conceptual and rational capacities, but at this more fundamental level of practical meanings.
In parallel to the monograph, I am also working on a number of articles, some, exegetical in spirit, others more theoretical and further teasing out the relation between our responsiveness to meanings and our agency.
I am currently working on a monograph on rule-following, based on my doctoral dissertation. A proposal for the monograph is now under review with Oxford University Press for their Oxford Philosophical Monograph Series. The monograph defends a novel account of rule-following through a critical engagement with the writings of McDowell, Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein. It makes the case that, in ordinary circumstances, understanding what a sign means is a matter of perceiving its meaning. My defence of this proposal is distinctive in crucial respects. First, taking inspiration from Merleau-Ponty, I argue that the meanings we are sensitive to are not only practical, but also more basic than linguistic meanings and conceptual contents. Second, I argue that, in being perceptually available to us, these meanings are motivational, in a way that is neither rational nor merely causal. Ultimately, I suggest that, if there is something distinctive about our mode of engagement with the world, it is not to be found at the level of our conceptual and rational capacities, but at this more fundamental level of practical meanings.
In parallel to the monograph, I am also working on a number of articles, some, exegetical in spirit, others more theoretical and further teasing out the relation between our responsiveness to meanings and our agency.
ii) Technological Gardens: Agency in the Age of AI
This is a new collaborative and interdisciplinary project, I have been working on with a colleague from the Korea Advance Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST), Professor Jinjoon Lee. The project aims to reappraise Heidegger’s question concerning technology in light of recent developments in machine learning and AI. It is informed by my ongoing work on agency and offers a radically new perspective on a number of topics, at the intersection of philosophy, arts and AI research (e.g. the alignment problem, the nature of attention and imagination, and the possibility of non-human artistic agency).
This is a new collaborative and interdisciplinary project, I have been working on with a colleague from the Korea Advance Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST), Professor Jinjoon Lee. The project aims to reappraise Heidegger’s question concerning technology in light of recent developments in machine learning and AI. It is informed by my ongoing work on agency and offers a radically new perspective on a number of topics, at the intersection of philosophy, arts and AI research (e.g. the alignment problem, the nature of attention and imagination, and the possibility of non-human artistic agency).